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Abstract
This article intends to analyze, in general, the romantic roots of Wittgenstein thought and, specifically, what could 
have been the position of Wittgenstein, especially the second Wittgenstein, on the philosophical problem of the 
language-reality relationship. No doubt it is a bold exercise, since Wittgenstein did not openly deal with this ques-
tion, and would have considered it nonsense. However, its elucidation- the idea that Wittgenstein was committed to 
antirealism- seems to make his conception of language more understandable, and in particular how private languages 
would not be possible.
Keywords: Wittgenstein, language, reality, antirealism, private language.
Una aproximación al antirrealismo de wittgenstein
Resumen
Este artículo pretende analizar la probable posición de Wittgenstein –sobre todo el segundo Wittgenstein–  respecto 
del problema filosófico de la relación lenguaje-realidad. Sin duda, se trata de ejercicio atrevido, ya que Wittgenstein 
no se ocupó de esta cuestión abiertamente y la habría considerado un sinsentido. Sin embargo, su dilucidación –la 
idea que Wittgenstein estaba comprometido con el antirrealismo– parece hacer más comprensible su concepción del 
lenguaje, y en particular cómo no serían posibles los lenguajes privados
Palabras clave: Wittgenstein, lenguaje, realidad, antirrealismo, lenguaje privado.
* Lecture read at the Fifth Symposium of the International Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Using Wittgenstein in Contemporary Philosophy, held at 
the Universidad Complutense de Madrid from May 20 to 21, 2015.
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I read: “...philosophers are no nearer to the meaning of 
‘Reality’ than Plato got...”. 
What a strange situation. How extraordinary that Plato 
could have got even as far as he did! Or that we could 
not get any further! Was because Plato 
was so extremely clever?
Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript.
 
In this lecture my concern is to rethink some central 
strands of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and so better un-
derstand what kind of philosopher he was. In particular 
I will focus on three issues: the way in which he could 
have seen the language-reality relationship; his conception 
of human beings, that is, his philosophical anthropology; 
and finally the role that authenticity plays in his thought. 
Likewise, I will emphasise that these subjects reveal some 
romantic roots in his thought... I am conscious that this 
task is perhaps risky and overbold. Wittgenstein was not a 
philosopher in a traditional sense nor a thinker with only 
one philosophy -how many Wittgensteins existed is an 
open question-, and therefore it does not seem possible 
to draw an outline of his thought without betraying in 
some sense his style and maybe his intentions.
That Wittgenstein was not a traditional philosopher is 
easy to see if we consider his conception of philosophy. 
Although he did not always understand language and his 
philosophical work in the same way, he always saw philo-
sophy as an analysis of language pursuing only transpa-
rency or clarity: a perspicuous sight without philosophical 
knowledge, without theses. The famous last aphorism of 
the Tractatus expresses this perfectly: “What we cannot 
speak about, we must pass over in silence”. The silence of 
the wise -not the silence of the ignorant-, the silence of 
those that know how language works, and know thereby 
what can and cannot be said meaningfully... In the end an 
ideal, an impossible silence, because human beings tend 
to be dissatisfied with language and run constantly against 
the rules, against the barriers of language.
On the other hand, Wittgenstein did not write books 
of philosophy in a traditional sense, that is, discursive 
explanations or demonstrative expositions. No, just as 
Joyce’s Ulysses is not a novel -a story is always an idealiza-
tion, a falsification of life- but an encounter of different 
formless streams of consciousness, so Wittgenstein’s 
works, including the preparatory notebooks of his more 
architectural Tractatus, look like a stream of live thoughts, 
and over time an inconclusive recollection of examples, 
counterexamples, perplexities, contradictions, that is, a 
crossroads. Obviously both Joyce and Wittgenstein produ-
ced thoughtful works -not automatic or spontaneous wri-
tings-, and their styles are very meaningful: they showed 
what the experience of thinking -and life- actually is, apart 
from the more or less conventional reconstructions such 
as a story, a narrative or a discourse.
As I have previously said, it is not possible to draw 
an outline of Wittgenstein’s philosophy and at the same 
time not betray in some sense his style and maybe his 
intentions. We have to go beyond where he went: we are 
doomed to interpret his intentions in a more or less dis-
cursive way. Thus, it is not surprising that the significance 
and status of his work has constantly been surrounded 
by disagreement. For instance, recently it has become 
fashionable to see Wittgenstein as a post-metaphysical 
thinker. This approach holds that both the Tractatus and 
the Philosophical Investigations are ironical books, self-
defeating exercises that do not produce conclusions. Not 
books of philosophy at all, but prominent examples of the 
impossibility of any philosophical knowledge. 
In my opinion, one of the merits of this view is that 
it points out or uncovers a tension in the meaning and 
value of Wittgenstein’s work. Wittgenstein was a tor-
mented, I mean, a very committed thinker, as we can 
see in this aphorism of 1944 included in Culture and 
Value: “Thoughts that are at peace. That’s what someone 
who philosophizes yearns for”. The idea is also present in 
the Philosophical Investigations: “The real discovery is the 
one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy 
when I want to” (#133). And that is the question: What 
was the upshot of philosophy for him? A perspicuous 
sight -the philosophically correct one- or merely that his 
thoughts are at peace? And are not these two possibilities 
the same thing? 
Not necessarily. It is possible to achieve the pers-
picuous sight because we have a philosophical ladder, 
though we have to throw it away after we have climbed 
up it because it is a nonsensical ladder. Or it is possible 
to reach peace therapeutically by means of examples and 
counterexamples that make us see things from a quiet, 
non-metaphysical point of view. In the first case, if we 
do not accept any ironical purport, we can still speak 
of correctness -a nonsensical correctness that produces 
an illuminating nonsense-, although in the end this co-
rrectness is useless. In the Preface of the Tractatus, after 
declaring that he has solved all problems, Wittgenstein 
says that the value of his book is that “it shows how little 
is achieved when the problems are solved”. Effectively, how 
little is achieved about the way in which we have to live 
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our lives -I mean, the question of authenticity-, when 
philosophical problems are solved.
 In turn, as is suggested by the second of these 
paths, it is possible that the language game of philosophy 
does not hold any privilege, and the only thing we can 
do is to unmask any attempt to play it, that is, therapy. 
But what does “unmask” mean here? In order to unmask 
anything, do not we need some criterion of correctness, 
that is, some transcendental approach? Wittgenstein said 
in 1931 that he only invented new similes, and that the 
preference for certain similes can be called a matter of 
temperament (see CV, pp: 19, 20). New similes, new 
pictures, new ways of looking at things... But what is a 
good simile or a good picture? And is our temperament 
the last word? No, Wittgenstein in 1949 suggests a very 
different answer: “a picture which is at the roots of all our 
thinking” (CV, p: 83), that is, a good picture -the philo-
sophically correct one- is a picture that is embedded in 
our linguistic action and form of life. 
Well, it is not my concern here to analyse in detail the 
nature and status of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. However 
the above remarks can help us in relation to the issues of 
this lecture: Wittgenstein would not only be promoting 
pictures -the good philosophical pictures, of course-, 
but those pictures that satisfy his temperament and that 
makes him capable of stopping doing philosophy when 
he wants to... Particularly, with regard to the problem of 
the language-reality relationship -the first question I will 
address- my intention is to ascribe to him an antirealist 
attitude -an antirealist picture. In my view, it is possible 
to interpret Wittgenstein’s aims as the effort to dismantle 
the unsatisfactory picture of metaphysical realism and 
specifically the metaphysical realism that lies beneath what 
he himself called “the modern conception of the world”, 
that is, scientism and the idea of progress (see T, 6.371). 
In an idealised way we can display metaphysical realism 
in two theses:
(i) Reality exists by itself, and it is structured in objects, 
properties and facts in a way that is indifferent to our 
epistemic relationship to them, that is, objects, properties 
and facts that self-identify.
(ii) There is or might exist a knowledge -or does not 
exist, or might not exist- that is the knowledge of reality 
itself, that is, a unique knowledge capable of reproducing 
reality itself in a true and complete way.
This is the skeleton, the mannequin that after we 
may dress with different clothes: common-sense realism, 
essentialism, scientific realism, noumenic realism, criti-
cal realism, etc. And also radical scepticism and radical 
relativism that propose that nothing goes or that anything 
goes. The difference in this casuistry depends on the way 
we interpret the thesis (ii). For instance, if the knowledge 
of reality is a human possibility -an actual, future or ideal 
possibility-, or whether it is not a human possibility, but a 
possibility for another kind of being -god, the angels. Or 
even if it is an absolute impossibility for any kind of being. 
However the picture is not complete yet: theses 
(i) and (ii) need some additional theses. In particular, 
an intellectualist view of human beings; the idea that 
knowledge is discovery, and truth is correspondence; 
and finally the assumption of semantic realism. And it 
is easy to understand how these presuppositions work: 
you suppose that knowledge is the essential activity for 
humans because they are, in essence, rational beings; 
you suppose that knowledge discovers and reproduces 
reality; and suppose that it is possible because the words 
-or at least the more crucial words- in which knowledge 
is articulated stand for the constituents of reality... Thus 
metaphysical realism tends to a special view of philosophy 
-the dominant one in our tradition-, namely, to explain 
how reality itself is, how knowledge and isomorphism 
between language and reality are possible, and explain 
what correspondence consists of. Or, if we were radical 
sceptics, radical relativists or noumenic realists, to explain 
how nothing of this kind is possible. 
Now, why should we see things in this way? Is not meta-
physical realism a nonsensical or misleading picture? Does 
it make sense to talk about reality itself and the knowledge 
of reality itself? It is possible to see metaphysical realism 
as a view that rests on the heart-warming belief that the 
intellect and knowledge -human or not- has some rele-
vant metaphysical status: in particular, that reality -reality 
itself- is in essence knowable, something to be known by 
men or another kind of intelligent being. However, as F. 
Nietzsche emphasised in On Truth and Lie in an Extra-
Moral Sense (1873), that is only a prejudice -an arrogant 
and pathetic anthropomorphism-, because the intellect 
has no further mission beyond human life. 
All right, let us leave out this bias, and the concept 
of reality itself as well. Or as Wittgenstein would say, 
let us return the word “reality” to its current usage, and 
restore its everyday uses. Why should this word have any 
philosophical privilege? Let us treat it as we treat, for 
instance, the word “lamp” (see PI, #97). Yet, the solution 
cannot be so easy: in fact, there is not any philosophical 
problem -I guess- with the word “lamp”, but there are 
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a lot of problems with the word “reality”. According to 
Wittgenstein, philosophical problems are consequence of 
a miscomprehension of the rules of language, but they are 
not mere technical mistakes. They are also an expression 
of our metaphysical dissatisfaction with the current rules 
of words. Just for this reason, and because of its persuasive 
profundity as well, we feel bewildered by them. 
Moreover, philosophical problems have another 
important peculiarity. They are resistant and recurrent: 
like diseases that have not been cured, they can reappear 
at any time. And so, even if we decide to abandon the 
concept of reality itself, it is possible that the problem 
will reappear again -maybe in a concealed way- when we 
consider, for instance, the existence of the things we are 
talking about, or when we are talking about the regularities 
we observe, or when we say that our statements are true... 
The problem of realism, I mean, will be not dissolved 
with a simple return to everyday language, and maybe we 
will need to say something about it: in fact, something 
in a non-Wittgenstenian style that may however clarify 
Wittgenstein’s intention.
Renouncing the concept of reality can mean two 
distinct things: renouncing every concept of reality, or 
only renouncing the concept of reality itself. The results 
are very different ones. If we follow the first path we will 
arrive at irrealism, linguistic idealism, or fictionalism. 
On the contrary, if we follow the second route we arrive 
at antirealism, I mean, antirealist realism -internal or 
pragmatic realism, as H. Putnam calls it-, an antirealism 
that is not an irrealism -an antirealism with a small “a”-, a 
kind of realism that is not metaphysical, but a realism only 
committed to the idea that reality is always the human 
spoken reality, and that it is nonsense to try to go further. 
In this respect, I think, what W. James said in 1907 in 
Pragmatism can help us.
Indeed, it is nonsense to try to go beyond our linguistic 
and epistemic praxis: it is not possible to describe or think 
reality apart from our manners of speaking and knowing: 
“the trail of the human serpent is thus over everything”. 
Anthropomorphism, yes, but a humble anthropomor-
phism -not the arrogant anthropomorphism of metaphy-
sical realism. Reality is what happens, and so it behaves 
kindly or in opposition to what we say and do: reality is 
what makes our expectations true or false. In other words: 
resistance and goodness against isomorphism and truth 
as correspondence... This is a moral metaphor: what is 
relevant to our concepts and beliefs is that they work, 
describe the human spoken reality, overcome the tests of 
facts, make predictions, etc., that is, that they are virtuous 
in the Greek sense of arete. 
From this point of view knowledge would only be a 
plastic network of removable concepts and beliefs pro-
duced by the creative and imaginative activity of human 
beings for the sake of solving problems, and not a process 
of discovering the hidden secrets of reality itself. The mo-
ral metaphor thereby runs against the spatial metaphor 
of metaphysical realism -correspondence, isomorphism, 
penetration and uncovering. But, what does remain here 
of the concept of reality? Well, if we are still interested 
in a philosophical use of the word “reality”, it would be 
equivalent to an ideal limit, a limit to our thought. In 
James’s words: “It is what is absolutely dumb and evanescent, 
the merely ideal limit to our minds. We can glimpse it, but 
we never grasp it; what we grasp is always some substitute 
for it which previous human thinking has peptonized and 
cooked for our consumption” (see Ch.VII). 
Far from the spatial metaphor of metaphysical rea-
lism, reality is not something in front of us, or in front 
of another possible subject: it is only an ideal limit. It is 
not a something, but not a nothing either. A limit to our 
thought: we cannot dispense with it, and at the same 
time we cannot think it -more anthropomorphism, but a 
humble and silent anthropomorphism. A limit, but not a 
dead limit. No, reality is not only what happens, but the 
happening of what happens, and in this sense a pressure, 
a coerciveness too: reality exerts kindness or opposition 
-pressure- on our concepts and beliefs. And this reality is 
a reality that is only possible to think from our manners 
of speaking and knowing. In fact, even the concepts of 
limit, pressure, coerciveness, kindness or opposition are 
human concepts -metaphors- as well. More anthropo-
morphism therefore. 
Well, let us go back to Wittgenstein. In Section xii 
of Part II of the Philosophical Investigations and in On 
Certainty (see OC, #615) he seems to use a moral meta-
phor. Likewise we can find here the picture of a plastic 
network of certainties and concepts in which we live, and 
also the idea that reality -”very general facts of nature”- is 
what allows us to have the concepts and certainties we 
have. Wittgenstein says that other certainties and other 
concepts could be possible as well, and that ours are not 
the only possible ones, nor the metaphysically correct ones 
-it would be nonsense to talk about correctness here. Ne-
vertheless neither whatever possibility would be possible. 
It is easy to grasp the mature Wittgenstein’s intention 
with the metaphor of pressure or coerciveness: reality -very 
general facts of nature- coerces without determining in 
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a causal sense. We cannot explain causally our concepts 
and basic certainties because others are possible -other 
concepts and other certainties might work as well. In other 
words: reality determines and at the same time underde-
termines the existence of our concepts and certainties: for 
this reason other possibilities are possible, although not 
all possibilities are possible. And we must not forget that 
this reality is just the human spoken reality, and so those 
“very general facts of nature” are facts that only make sense 
to describe from our language and praxis, that is, the idea 
of reality as pressure is the idea of reality as limit. We have 
reached the bedrock where our spade is turned, and we 
must pass over in silence.
Again, according to Wittgenstein, as reality is always 
a human spoken reality, it is meaningless to speak or 
think about reality itself, and not because of some special 
reason -a human impotence or a peculiar elusiveness of 
reality. No, the problem is that there is no problem: there 
is nothing about which we can speak or think. At most, 
we can only glimpse the pressure -the kindness or resis-
tance- of reality, the human spoken reality. As the young 
Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus, the fact that reality can 
be described by a particular system of description does 
not tell us anything about reality, “but what does tell us 
something about it is the precise way in which it is possible 
to describe it by these means” (T, #6.342). 
Nothing about reality itself, but only about the way 
in which our language is arranged, including its a priori 
extensional structure and causal laws -causality does not 
proceed from extensionality: rather it is a way in which 
human beings shape propositions from their inductive 
natural tendencies. In other words: the kindness of rea-
lity does not show the metaphysical correctness of some 
system of description -this is the illusion of scientism; 
neither the metaphysical correctness of extensionality and 
causality. No, that reality can be described by language 
and the fact that some systems of description work better 
than others only shows the kindness of reality.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein distinguishes the concept 
of reality (Wirklichkeit) from the concept of the world 
(Welt), that is, what is possible -the existence and non-
existence of states of affairs- and what is the case, the facts 
(see T, #1-1.12 and #2.06). However, what is the case are 
not only the facts, but the happening of the facts. And 
about this happening we cannot speak, we must pass 
over in silence: it is an unthinkable limit that only shows 
its pressure or coerciveness. The happening of facts -the 
miracle of the existence of the world- and the view, the 
feeling of the world as a limited or necessary whole is the 
mystical. However the mystical is not only a view or a 
feeling: it is also an attitude, an attitude of acceptance of 
facts -a religious attitude without religious beliefs-, and 
so an ethical attitude, a stoic attitude that only tries to 
alter the way in which the facts are lived. For this reason 
the world of the happy man is a different world from that 
of the unhappy, despite the fact that these worlds can be 
extensionally equivalents, that is, include the same facts 
(see T, #6.43-#6.45).  
But let us come back to the idea that the word “reality” 
does not have any metaphysical privilege. As I have said, 
the problem is that, although we do not say anything 
about reality as a whole, it is possible that we need to talk 
about the reality of the things we speak about. Philoso-
phers are very peculiar people: they agree that trees or pains 
exist, but they often are at odds about what it means to 
say that trees or pains exist. Do they exist by themselves 
or do they not exist at all? Or do they exist only insofar as 
someone knows them? And what should be our strategy 
in this case? Well it depends: each case is different and will 
need its own treatment -trees, pains, electrons or nations 
do not exist in the same way. Yet the following general 
approach is possible: it will never be meaningful to say 
in a metaphysical sense that something exists by itself, 
but it only makes sense to say that something exists from 
our manners of speaking. Not that it exists “because of” 
but “from” our manners of speaking: for example, it only 
makes sense to say that trees or pains -the physical and the 
mental- exist from our manners of speaking.
But not only from our manners of speaking. Trees and 
pains are not linguistic realities: trees cast shadows and 
pains are painful. However, trees and pains are not, as 
semantic realism professes, in front of us in a metaphysical 
sense waiting to be named and labelled by our words; 
neither as causes of our behaviour. On the contrary, our 
behaviour is just what distinguishes, isolates and identifies 
the entities we speak about: our behaviour is not merely 
an answer to stimulus, but action -quasi symbolic natural 
action. And these natural actions and reactions, as the 
mature Wittgenstein suggests, are interwoven with our use 
of words in such a way that sometimes it is not easy nor 
possible to separate them. This is the case, for instance, 
of the expressive language of sensations, and in general 
what we might call the deep geological strata of language. 
And so we should say that it only makes sense to say that 
trees and pains exist from our manners of speaking and 
natural behaviour. 
These natural actions and reactions make up, for Witt-
genstein, the shared behaviour of mankind, the behaviour 
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in which human beings, as a matter of fact, tend to agree. 
It is the system of reference, the natural background -in 
fact, one of the very general facts of nature- that allows 
us to agree spontaneously in language, that is, to learn 
a language by training, understand each other, and un-
derstand other languages and other cultures. Our shared 
behaviour that is part of our natural history and the limit 
of whatever philosophical explanation -that is how human 
beings act. As we can see, there is no danger of linguistic 
idealism or radical relativism. 
And for similar reasons ostensive definition cannot 
work, and a private language is impossible. In effect, 
the problem is that language, and specifically a private 
language might not even begin by means of ostensive 
definitions -not that the concept of correctness disappears 
with privacy, and that public rules or social agreement are 
necessary. In reality, Wittgenstein rejects the object-name 
model of semantic realism, not only because a private 
object -a private beetle- might not form part of a public 
language, but above all because it does not make sense to 
speak of sensations previously to our linguistic praxis 
-against semantic and metaphysical realism, sensations do 
not self-identify (see PI, #244, #257, #293 and #304). In 
other words: mental reality is not segmented by itself, but 
it is divided by means of the framework of our linguistic 
praxis and natural behaviour -our form of life. We have 
arrived again at the bedrock where our philosophical spade 
is turned -the insuperable anthropomorphism- and we 
must pass over in silence.
In ostensive definition, and also in following rules, it is 
easy to appreciate the wrong role played by intellectualism 
in metaphysical realism. Ostensive definition not only pre-
supposes that the object exists by itself, but that this object 
is recognised and identified as this object by the learner 
before he or she is introduced to this object in language -an 
intellectual operation that cannot be applied to anything. 
Likewise in learning rules we do not intellectually grasp 
pre-existing rules, but rather our behaviour agrees with 
the praxis to which we are being introduced by training. 
And so we might say that rules are created and recreated 
by the activities in which humans converge. Humans 
beings are intelligent, but they are not intelligences. In 
this sense, in On Certainty Wittgenstein says: “I want to 
regard man here as an animal, as a primitive being to which 
one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a 
primitive state: Any logic good enough for a primitive means 
of communication needs no apology from us. Language did 
not emerge from some kind of ratiocination” (OC, #475).
Not intelligences, nor selves. Otherwise, the sense in 
which philosophy can talk about the subject in a non-
metaphysical way is as human beings or, better, as human 
activity. But not the transcendental activity which the 
Tractatus spoke about; neither an activity explicable by 
science in a causal sense. No, for the mature Wittgens-
tein, human beings are spontaneous, expressive, creative, 
inductive, intentional, symbolic and ritual beings... Hu-
man beings more or less contingently produce languages, 
intentional realities, horizons of sense, values, etc., that 
are transmitted, modified and enriched from generation 
to generation. And this kind of activity -creativity- is just 
what philosophy is interested in. Or, is it by chance that 
Wittgenstein used the concept of game -language games- 
for describing the nature of the human linguistic activities?
Human beings are animals that play -not the only 
ones, of course-, and live situated in groups, communities, 
traditions, landscapes... And we have arrived at the point 
where we are able to distance ourselves from our original 
locations and so embrace different and more widespread 
horizons of sense. To create distance, yes, but not to lose 
our original location. Wittgenstein was not a cosmopoli-
tan nor a universalist. The space of reasons exists, but far 
from whatever metaphysical optimism -human beings 
are artists, but this means nothing in a moral sense- the 
human situation is, in the end, conflict, and when reasons 
are finished we will only dispose of persuasion: everyone 
will assert his own justifications or his moral images (see 
OC, #612).
However human beings do not only play, they are also 
animals that live searching for themselves: individualism 
is one of the tendencies of our process of humanization 
and form of life. And so, one of the most acute questions 
for us is “who am I?”, or “who do I want to be?”, or ma-
ybe in a more ancient form “how should I live?”. These 
questions are not equivalents to “what kind of entity 
am I?” and “how can I know that I am the same entity 
over time?” These last questions -typical of metaphysical 
realism- presuppose that human beings are substances, 
and would have created the problem of personal identity 
as the problem of the identity of a substance. On the 
contrary, the former questions point to the personal self-
creation and authenticity as the most relevant problems, 
and suggest that human beings are or live as existences, 
lives, and not substances. 
Wittgenstein devoted very little time to personal iden-
tity -some passages of The Blue Book and the Philosophical 
Investigations (see PI, #404)-, and was always against the 
metaphysical paradigm of an absolute identity. In his 
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opinion there is a great variety of contextual criteria for 
the identity of a person, and that invites us to think that 
he saw people as social and narrative constructions with an 
inconclusive identity of degree: existences, lives, concerned 
with their personal self-creation and authenticity. In this 
sense, the last paragraphs of the Tractatus about ethics, sen-
se of life and the mystical, and a great deal of the material 
of his personal notebooks, show clearly how authenticity 
-sincerity- was an inescapable question for him. And the 
urgency of this questioning and the answer -pessimism 
and stoicism- are not independent of his disquietude or 
restlessness towards the modern conception of the world: 
the spirit of the main current of European and American 
civilization, that is, scientism and the idea of progress. 
But we must finish. At the beginning we promised that 
we would present some romantic roots in Wittgenstein’s 
thought, and now we can deliver them: in my view, they 
are precisely the pictures of antirealism, human sponta-
neity, creativity, personal self-creation and authenticity 
that we find in his works. Even in his antirealism -the rest 
are well known romantic topics- is possible to discover 
a romantic footprint. It is true that the Romantics still 
thought reality in terms of metaphysical realism as an 
undifferentiated and non-rational activity, power or will 
that underlies the phenomena; and that they invoked 
aesthetic intuition, feeling or music as the best knowledge 
of reality itself. However the bankruptcy of rationalism 
and scientism -mechanism- that these views exhibit are, I 
think, the background of the Wittgenstenian antirealism. 
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